Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 5

3-1-1994

When Myths Collide: An Analysis of Conflicting U.S.-Japanese
Views on Economics, Law, and Values
David Broiles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
David Broiles, When Myths Collide: An Analysis of Conflicting U.S.-Japanese Views on Economics, Law,
and Values, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 109 (1994).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V1.I1.3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Broiles: When Myths Collide: An Analysis of Conflicting U.S.-Japanese View

WHEN MYTHS COLLIDE: AN ANALYSIS OF

CONFLICTING U.S.-JAPANESE VIEWS ON
ECONOMICS, LAW, AND VALUES
DAVID BROILESt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................

I.
II.

THE DISTURBING REPORTS ..............................
GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND THE MARKET
ECONOMY .................................................

A . The M iracle .........................................
B. Pluralism with Consensus.....................
C. Plan-Rationalvs. Market-Rational Economies .......
D. The Visible Hand ....................................
E. A Different Relationship .............................
III. How JAPANESE RELATE: SOME EXAMPLES .............
A. Employer-Employee Relations .......................
B. Japanese Corporations:A FamilialRelation ..........
C. The Closed Society ..................................
D. Summary Observations..............................
IV.

BETWEEN

"Is"

A. Private Sector: JapaneseAttitudes Toward Contracts.
B. Public Sector: Rights, Duties, and The Law ..........
1. Administrative Guidance ........................
2. Courts, Law, and Conciliation ...................
a. Historical Observations.......................
b. Litigation in Japan ...........................
c. Conciliation and Dispute Resolution ..........
C. Judicial Competence in Policy Issues .................
D. Summary Observations ..............................
M YTHS COLLIDE ..........................................

A. The Japanese Myth of Uniqueness ...................
B. Why Japan Challenges The American Myth ..........
C. Alternative Viewpoints ...............................
1. Solutions for Reappraising the Myth ............
2. Competition and Cooperation ...................
VI.

113
116
116
118
119
121
122
123
123
124
125
126

AND "OUGHT:" DUTIES, RIGHTS, AND

PRIVILEGES ..............................................

V.

110

CONCLUSION ..............................................

126
126
128
129
131
132
133
133
135
136
137
137
140
141
141
144
146

t David Broiles is a practicing attorney in Fort Worth, Texas. LL.M., 1994, Georgetown Law Center; LL.B., 1968, Yale University; Ph.D., 1963, Ohio State Univer-

sity; M.A., 1960, Southern Methodist University; B.A., 1959, Southern Methodist
University.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V1.I1.3
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

INTRODUCTION

Americans are deeply disturbed by the reports they receive from
popular media and from their political leaders regarding United
States-Japanese trade issues. Americans hear that Japanese exports to
the United States hurt domestic industries, cost workers jobs, and that
the Japanese do not allow U.S. firms to freely export to Japan, all of
which seems unfair. Scholars in this debate emphasize the differences
in the relationships between business, government, social structures,
and the legal systems in Japan and the United States to explain these
reported facts found so disturbing to Americans, and to explain Japan's economic success.
Americans recognize Japan and the United States are culturally different. There is nothing disturbing about this, after all, India and the
United States are culturally different but these differences are not disquieting to Americans. The perception of how the Japanese industrial
machine works disturbs Americans because it conflicts with fundamental American beliefs about the individual, the government, and
the role of law in the economy and how each of these elements relate
to the other in the economy. Japan should not work as well as it does.
What disturbs Americans is that the Japanese miracle seems to
threaten not only the U.S. economy, but challenges Americans' assumptions about themselves.
The degree to which Americans are disturbed about Japan is reflected in the moral tone of the rhetoric. The moral tone of American
concern about Japan's success in foreign trade is reflected in descriptions of the problems discussed and in the proposals for solutions. It
has been suggested Americans have come to see the trade deficit as a
"national shame" that must be fixed.' Some examples of the current
trade rhetoric are illustrative.
American manufacturers of televisions and consumer electronic
products claimed their market was taken over by the Japanese
through an illegal conspiracy designed to monopolize 2the market, in
which a primary player was the Japanese government.
Between 1958 and 1968 steel imports increased over tenfold, with
steel coming from Japan and threatening steel industries in the United
States. One of the causes was attributed to "foreign governments"
policies of assisting their steel industries.3 The solution to the perceived unfair practices was voluntary export restraints. Quotas were
imposed.
1. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Educating Bill: A History Lesson, WALL
2, 1993 at A8.

ST.

J., Apr.

2. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 138
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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The American machine tool industry claimed it was being undermined by the Japanese because of illegal subsidies to Japanese producers by the Japanese government; the creation of an international
cartel; and by discrimination against U.S. commerce. In the United
States, machine tool production was considered a "strategic" industry,
voluntary restraints were imposed, and domestic production was
protected.4
U.S. semiconductor producers accused the Japanese of dumping
products on the United States and world markets at unfair prices, and
contended Japan's own market was restricted, effectively barring U.S.
producers. The solution was the negotiation of a semiconductor
agreement, which restricted the portion of the American market Japan "could have," and "guaranteed" or set a goal for a twenty percent
share of the Japanese market for American manufacturers.' The
United States treated this twenty percent share as a commitment, and
between 1986 and the end of 1992 its share of the Japanese
market
6
increased from about nine percent to twenty percent.
Voluntary export restraints ("VER") have been "accepted" by the
Japanese as the prevailing method of protection of U.S. domestic industries from perceived unfair Japanese competition. VERs have
been applied to textiles, steel, color televisions, automobiles, machine
tools and integrated circuits.' Despite continued U.S. pressure, the
Japanese have "rejected the idea of establishing
new specific targets
'8
for Japanese imports of American goods."
Two concepts permeating U.S. trade protectionism against Japan
are "fair trade" and "unfair trade." 9 Americans, it is argued, can cope
with fair competition, but need not tolerate unfair competition.
Prohibitions against dumping, or selling at less than a fair price, provide legal redress for some U.S. industries; steel and minivans being
the most recent to hope for relief. 10
To eliminate the trade deficit, the United States is attempting to
open the Japanese market to U.S. imports. The Japanese, chastened
by their experience in semiconductors, thought they made clear in
1991, when President Bush took U.S. auto executives to Japan, that
the declarations made by Japanese automakers to buy $19 billion in
4. CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, TRADERS OR WARRIORS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN TRADING PLACES 217-49 (1988).
5. John C. Kingery, The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement and the GATT:
STAN. J. INT'L. L. 467 (1989).
& Peter Behr, Turning Against Trade by Numbers, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 1993, at D1.
7. John 0. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United
States-Japan Trade Conflict, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 403, 415 (1989).
8. David E. Sanger, Japan Leader Takes Hard Line on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1993, at A10.
9. Carl J. Green, The New Protectionism, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 11 (1981).
10. James Bovard, Commerce's Latest FairTrade Fraud,WALL ST. J., Jan 28, 1993,
at A14.

Operating
in a Legal Vacum, 25
6. Paul Blustein
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auto parts by 1994 was not a legal commitment. The U.S. Trade Representative is now expressing concern Japan is not meeting its
"pledges."'" In the annual report of the U.S. Trade Representative on
"unfair trading practices," Japan was "identified as the biggest
offender."' 2
Opening Japan's markets to U.S. imports is probably the most significant feature of the Strategic Internal Initiatives ("SII") Agreement3
of 1990, particularly reform of the Japanese distribution system.'
Although Japan removed nearly all significant formal protectionist
barriers in the early 1970s, U.S. companies still have not made significant inroads into the Japanese market.' 4 Proof of improper non-tariff
barriers seems elusive, but there is still the belief " 'that a very bad
thing' is happening to the United States, and the culprit is Japan."' 5
Japanese successes and American failures in trade are often explained in highly emotive or moralistic terms. Japanese are said to be
unfair, conspiratorial, unethical, guilty of imposing stringent quotas,
manipulative of the market, engaging in collusive market practices,
subsidizing industries, limiting access, biased against imports, and as
unfairly limiting product promotion. 16 The message is that U.S. companies would be able to compete with Japanese companies
"if the
17
rules are fair. If not, something may need correcting.'
This paper examines why Americans so often feel compelled to describe the Japanese in such strong terms. Americans are threatened
by Japan. It is not that Japan is stronger, or bigger. The problem is
that the Japanese are perceived as different. The difference threatens
American assumptions about the American way. This will be illustrated by first reviewing what the problem is between the United
States and Japan - centering on the trade imbalance. Then some
scholars' analyses of this problem are reviewed, not to find the cause
of the problem, but to identify common themes. The common theme
is that Japan and the United States do things differently. The differences are reflected in the way government and business relate, in the
different role of law in the two societies and in different perceptions
about values inherent in the individual or the community. These dif11. Peter Behr, Officials Warn Japan on Failure to Buy More U.S. Auto Parts,
Apr. 1, 1993, at B12.
12. Robert D. Hershey Jr., US. Trade Survey Calls Japan Most Restrictive, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at D1.
13. Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan, SII and the InternationalHarmonization of Domestic Economic Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 469 (1991).
14. Haley, supra note 7.
15. Ryutaro Komiya & Irie Kazutomo, The U.S.-Japan Trade Problem: An Economic Analysis from a Japanese Viewpoint, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE:
SHOULD IT CHANGE? 65, 69 (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990).
16. Edward Lincoln, An American Policy Agenda, JAPAN'S UNEQUAL TRADE,
135-36 (1990).
17. Robert Keatley, Clinton Grasps Japan Trade Problem and Must Keep an Open
Mind to Solve It, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at A6.
WASH. POST,
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ferences are described, at least as reflected in the scholarly literature
on the subjects. Finally, the hope is that by recognizing that the Japanese challenge the American myth about the market economy, and
how it should function in terms of individualism and societal relations,
one can come to the conclusion that the strong terms used to describe
Japanese conduct mask the real problem: that Japan challenges
America's myth about itself.
Some words of caution. I conclude that Japanese views about law,
rights and duties are different from American views on these subjects.
These differences, while ones of degree, are nonetheless important.
My conclusions are not empirical. I lack the ability to contrast United
States and Japanese history and culture in order to provide insight
into how 250 million Americans differ from 115 million Japanese.
However, analysis of the assumptions reflected in our debate about
each other does not require such an effort. The very debate about
Japanese and American relations reflects unarticulated assumptions
about both societies. I propose to illuminate one set of those assumptions - those beliefs that form a part of the basic myth about
America, which I believe Japan's success, and the means to that success, greatly challenge. Whatever the outcome of the trade disputes
between the two countries, America's myth about itself, and the Japanese myth about the uniqueness of the Japanese way, constantly collide. If both change course a little, hopefully collisions will be less
frequent, and not violent.
I.

THE DISTURBING REPORTS

In 1992 Japan's worldwide trade surplus exceeded $100 billion. The
Japanese were embarrassed."8 With a $40 billion trade surplus with
the United States, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ("MITI") was quoted as saying "certainly we are
not proud of it."' 19 Mr. Kantor, the U.S. Trade Representative, told
the Senate that "the continuing large Japanese trade surplus" would
be "high on our agenda" in 1993.20 Some Japanese have suggested a
solution to the trade deficit may be found in increased Japanese government domestic spending, which will cause an increase in domestic
consumption thus reducing the surplus. The Japanese government has
proposed huge public works programs of between $93 billion and $130
billion in response to U.S. pressure.21 U.S. firms hope to get a share
18. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Japan Adopts EmbarrassedMien In Anticipation of '92
Trade Tally, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at A10.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. James Sterngold, Japan, Still in Slump, Plans 2d Public Works Program,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at D1.
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of this market, thus reducing the trade deficit.22 Mr. Kantor "pointed
out the importance" of Japanese "set-asides" for U.S. firms.23 Some
Japanese contend that the Japanese trade imbalance reflects the
stronger yen.24 The dollar continues to hit new lows against the yen,
falling from 13525 to below 105, a twenty two percent decline in approximately a year.
Americans are not short on opinions, but a common contention is
"Japan's fundamentally different system of competition and trade" is
at the bottom of it.26 Sony's Chairman, Mr. Morita, concurs, saying
"[i]f Japan persists in clinging to its traditional system, it runs the risk
of becoming isolated in the world. ' 27 President Clinton, described as
peeved, said "the persistence of the surplus the Japanese enjoy ...can

real,
only lead one to the conclusion that the possibility of obtaining
2
remote.
somewhat
is
market
Japanese
the
to
access
even
Some economists assert that the trade surplus has been caused by
Japan's recession. Although exports rose eight percent in 1992, to
$339.76 billion, the $107 billion surplus was the result of a recession
and fewer Japanese purchases of imports. 29 Japanese investors reportedly spent only $1.92 billion on U.S. takeovers and other deals in
1992, down from "the $3.85 billion they shelled out in 1991. "130 To
some, this looks like a whopping $5.77 billion of the United States
purchased by the Japanese in two years, which when added to approximately $45 billion purchased from 1987-1990, comes to more than $50
billion in U.S. assets acquired in six short years. Japanese purchases
of real estate in the United States fell to $807 million in 1992, down
from a 1988 peak of $16.54 billion. 3 ' Still Americans worry that the
Japanese seem to be buying up the country. While Japanese investment in the United States has declined, it has increased in Southeast
Asia, with over $40 billion invested in the past eight years. If Japan's
exports from Southeast Asia are considered, one analyst estimates Japan's real trade surplus with the United States at closer to $60
billion.32
22. Clay Chandler & David P. Hamilton, U.S. Firms Press to Get a Share of Japan's Big Spending Package, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1993, at A6.
23. Schlesinger, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Dollar Hits New Low Versus Yen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
1993, at D1, D20.
26. Schlesinger, supra note 18.
27. Id.
28. Keatley, supra note 17.
29. Paul Blustein, Japanese Trade Surplus Hits Record $107 Billion, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 1993, at G1.
30. Michael R. Sesit, Japan's U.S. Buying Spree Dries Up as Problems Grow,
WALL ST.

J., Jan. 27, 1993, at C1.

31. Jim Carlton, Japanese Investment in US. Real Estate Dried Up in '92 Amid
Mar. 19, 1993, at A2.
Problems at Home, WALL ST. J.,
32. Schlesinger, supra note 18.
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Americans are concerned about the Japanese government's intervention in its economy. A recent example is illuminating. No institution more exemplifies the American ideal of the free market economy
than the stock market. It is an American article of faith that the government should never intervene to prop it up. But compare Japan's
stock market. After reaching a high on the Nikkei market index of
39,000 in 1989, by August 1992 it had lost sixty-three percent of that
value as it plunged to 14,309. 33 The Japanese government reacted,
pumping billions of dollars in yen into the market. One commentator
called this a "striking illustration of Japanese-style interference in the
marketplace aimed at furthering the national interest. '34 Stocks
surged, increasing twelve percent in a two week period in March 1993
alone, lifting stock values $199 billion. 35 This massive government intervention was variously described as "altogether antithetical to free
markets" and as illustrative that in Japan "control is highly valued"
and the nation has a "managed trade and managed economy. "36
There are those who want the United States to emulate the Japanese
method; however, one must "wonder if the United States is equipped
to run a successful industrial policy, considering the fact that U.S.
business executives lack the collectivist spirit. '37 Those who react in
horror at such thoughts respond: "A rigged economy usually backfires
on its riggers eventually."38
U.S. - Japan relations are to the finger pointing stage. Why does
Japan have such a large trade surplus, not only with the United States,
but in Europe and Asia as well? Why is its export economy so successful? Why are its imports not larger? Does it act unfairly? Does
the government intervene in the economy to give its export businesses
an unfair advantage while protecting domestic markets? How can Japan's government pick winners, when it is a fundamental tenet of U.S.
beliefs that the free market determines winners. Are the Japanese different? Should we be more like them?
Answers to these questions abound. Not surprisingly, they conflict.
But even in disagreement, common themes emerge centering around
the relationship between government and business as affecting the
economy. Examining these themes will illustrate how the perception
of Japan as a planned economy, and wliat that entails, threatens
American suppositions about how things must work, or at least should
work. Japan's success challenges the myths we have about ourselves.
33. Paul Blustein, Japan Makes a Market, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1993, at Al, A18.
34. Id. at Al.
35. Quentin Hardy, Japanese Stocks Surge, But Reasons for Rise Make Some

Queasy,

WALL

ST. J., Mar. 19, 1993, at Al.

36. Id. at Al, A5.
37. Paul Blustein, Asia's Mixed Results on IndustrialPolicy, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
1993, at H5.
38. George Melloan, Japan'sEconomic Machine Needs an Overhaul,WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at A15.
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These themes are developed by examining what is called the "Japanese miracle." I review suggested causes of the miracle, concentrating
on the role of the government in the economy, the corporate structure, and some cultural institutions. Common themes about the
causes of Japan's miracle shed light on differences between Japan and
the United States involving social institutions like government, business, and law.
II.

GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND THE MARKET ECONOMY

A.

The Miracle

Thomas K. McCraw has reviewed the U.S. and Japanese economies
since World War II, developing the thesis that "the entire structure
and performance of each country, over the span of the postwar period,
has been directly affected by two very different sets of business-government relationships."39 The difference in the two countries is related to the perceived degree of individual freedom in the U.S.
economy which is thought not to be present in the Japanese economy.
McCraw contends that the difference "must be related to the economic policies pursued by business and government in Japan and the
United States."4 Japan's policy was one of export and survival. Having adopted this strategy, the Japanese had to decide what to export
and where. They decided to export capital-intensive and high technology products to America. McCraw characterizes this strategy as one
of "breathtaking boldness."41 Further, the "Japanese government rejected the option of heavy foreign borrowing" and "Japanese officials
rejected a policy ... of allowing direct foreign investment" therefore
42
"Japanese policymakers fell back on ... a pay as you go strategy.
"Government and business planners" then "selected" improved education, invited in some technical companies, purchased technology
and reverse engineered to implement the plan.43 The domestic market was protected from imports. Even with all of these decisions and
plans, McGraw says Japan never became a planned economy in the
socialist sense, but was, and remains, a highly competitive society.4
How were these policydecisions made and enforced on those who
might not agree? McGraw suggests several answers. First, the bureaucracy in Japan is respected and intelligent. MITI operates primarily
through persuasion.45 The decisions and plans described above were
39. Thomas K. McCraw, From Partners To Competitors: An Overview of the Period Since World War II, in AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN, 1-33 (Thomas K. McCraw ed.,
1981).
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 11-12.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id. at 24.
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the result of consensus building. McGraw says that "[n]owhere is the
difference between America and Japan more conspicuous than in the
roles played by the judiciary and the legal profession."46 This is because law and lawyers do not play a significant part in the decision
making and enforcement mechanism underlying Japanese cooperation. For the Japanese, cooperation is not based on legal coercion.
What has this consensus-building, planning and boldly-deciding society done? It has developed the second largest economy in the
world. It has gone from a trade deficit of $10.9 billion in 1980, to a
surplus of $39.6 billion in 1985, to a $107 billion surplus in 1992. If
that is a miracle for the Japanese, it is perceived by many as a
nightmare for the United States, where trade47friction may usher in "a
new era of Japan versus the United States."
One broad generalization from McGraw's work is that the relationship between government and business in Japan is one of cooperation.
Japanese business leaders and government bureaucrats make the decisions. Then, based on-consensus, they implement them. This relationship is inconsistent with the American perception of a free market
economy. The essence of a market economy is that efficiency is the
result of each individual deciding what is in his or her own interest.
With freedom from government restraint, individuals carrying out
their own plans will efficiently produce the products the market
desires and needs. Government should not decide what to produce.
Government cannot pick winners. It regulates. It attempts to eliminate those not infrequent glitches in the capitalist system. Government's increased presence is antithetical to the market. If McGraw's
generalizations are accurate, then why do the Japanese have a successful economy?
In order to describe the relationship between business freedom,
government interference, and the concept of a market economy, one
might think of the relationship between the two in terms of a continuum. An economy with no governmental intervention could be described as a ten. An economy with government controlling all
activities would be a zero. This fictional scale may assist in understanding where the differences between Japan's and America's approaches to the government-business relationship might be. This is
particularly so because the American conception of that relationship
focuses on law, and the government creation of rights, duties and privileges in its regulation of business and the market economy. Americans think of government as operating to impede freedom by creating
laws. Where the role of law in the economy is less restrictive, individuals or businesses are freer to make their own decisions. Individual
free choice is the essence of the free market. This simplistic statement
46. Id. at 26.
47. Id. at 33.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

9

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

illustrates how Japan and the United States differ. One difference has
to do with the role of law in Japan and the United States. Later, I will
describe the role of law in Japan in order to illustrate why Americans
perceive Japan as a threat, and why Japan challenges fundamental
American beliefs about the market economy.
B.

Pluralism with Consensus

Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky strike a middle ground on the
role of government and business in Japan's economy, describing it as a
"market-oriented, private enterprise economic system."4 The government's role is characterized "as a mixture of active intervention
and benign neglect." 49 Immediately post-war, government incentives
encouraged exports, but as the economy grew, the government bureaucracy envisaged "a shift of emphasis from labor-intensive technologically unsophisticated industries . . . into more technologically

advanced industries. ' 50 Government policies facilitated this shift.
How important has the government been? Patrick and Rosovsky
credit it with providing a favorable environment, but "the main impetus to growth has been private."'" They find nothing unique in Japan
about the relationship between government and business - possibly
the United States is atypical.
How does the relationship work? They suggest it is simplistic to
believe either that government controls business or that business controls government. Nor are government and business leaders a homogeneous and unified force effectively pursuing a commonly perceived
national interest. Japanese are no more monolithic in their goals or
the means to achieve them than Americans.5 2 They conclude Japan
has a pluralistic "distribution of power in economic decision making."' 5 3 There are competing interests of big businesses, small businesses, farmers, labor, consumers, et cetera, representing a multitude
of interest groups. These statements could describe American society
just as well. What then makes Japanese society different?
Patrick and Rosovsky suggest two important factors: "consensus on
economic goals and on means of attaining them, and common ideology or values."' 54 A close and harmonious government-business relationship is based in the Japanese "emphasis on group rather than
individual, on cooperation and conciliation aimed at harmony, on na48. Hugh Patrick & Henry Rosovsky, Japan'sEconomic Performance: An Overview, in ASIA'S NEw GIANT, How ThE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS, 43-55 (Hugh
Patrick & Henry Rosovsky eds., 1976).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

44.
45-46.
47.
49.
51.
52.
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tional rather than personal welfare." 55 This contrasts with the American economic model, where individuals freely maximizing their own
interests in the arena of free competition - meaning free from government intervention - supposedly leads to the best or most efficient
economy.
On the fictional continuum, and the Japanese economy as described
above, the relationship between business and government might be a
three. The important observation is that though Japan is very competitive and pluralistic, because of their culture, Japanese reach a consensus on goals and means. The underlying difference between the
Japanese and Americans is their primacy of the group over the individual. What Patrick and Rosovsky leave unexplored is how modern
Japan has achieved cohesion of purpose and united efforts as to
means. But they do suggest two important ideas: (1) though pluralistic and competitive, the Japanese reach what looks like a consensus on
ends and means, and (2) this is explained by the primacy of the group
over the individual. We will come back to these themes.
C. Plan-Rationalvs. Market-Rational Economies
Chalmers Johnson, one of the best known experts on Japan, probably would place the Japanese economy close to a nine on the fictional
scale in his evaluation of the role of government in the Japanese economy.56 Johnson finds a fundamental difference between the Japanese
and U.S. economies. The Japanese economy is plan-rational; the U.S.
but
economy is market-rational. The differences are not of degree,
57
defined in the conception "of the state in economic affairs.
Differences involve comparisons. Here I need to briefly describe
the prevalent American myth about what should be government's role
in the economy. The popular articulation of American capitalism presupposes the supremacy of the individual, whose free choices in the
economic arena maximizes benefits. The state is the "other"; it takes
away freedom by regulation. Laws create duties on those regulated,
or give them rights or privileges. Why would an individual subject his
or her individual self-interest to the common good? Because of some
regulatory duty created by the state. Why obey these regulations?
Because the individual's relation to the state is like a social contract
with other individuals. Individuals relinquish some of their freedom,
legitimizing state action to promote the common good in those areas
where unrestrained freedom might fail. Life without a social contract
is not desirable. There are some goods, like protection of property,
enforcement of contracts, and regulation for the common good
achievable only by concerted effort. Limited government regulation is
55. Id. at 53.
56. CHALMERS

JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 3, 8 (1982).

57. Id.

at

18.
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acceptable, so long as individual freedom is given maximum value.
These are jealously guarded areas of relinquished freedoms, and if the
state goes too far, and seeks to benefit one economic interest over
another,58 the social contract has been violated, and the state's action is
invalid.
This, in a few words, is what I believe to be a basic American myth,
from which flows our concepts of the primacy of the individual, the
promotion of the ultimate value of individual freedom, and a negative
attitude toward state regulation and control. To call it a myth is not to
say it is false, but to emphasize it is fundamental, and, of course, not
factual. Few would contend that there was a state of nature, or that
there is a social contract. These are analytical tools for explanation
and justification. 59 Unfortunately, something about the way the Japanese do things challenges this myth. I hope to show why.
The American myth, the individual-freedom-is-primary model,
dominates U.S. assumptions about government and business relationships. Johnson contrasts this with Japan's developmental-orientationmodel.60 The U.S. regulatory model concerns itself with rules forms and procedures of economic competition - while the dominant
feature of the Japanese plan-rational state is setting substantive social
and economic goals. Therefore, in Japan the government gives great
attention to the development and implementation of an industrial policy, with the structures of domestic industry promoting the goal of international competitiveness. The United States has no plan at all;
regulation and planning not being synonymous.
There is a narrow issue to be focused on here. How do the Japanese
get each other and businesses to do what is planned? In the regulatory market of the United States, motivation is achieved through the
coercive power of law. Laws create rights, duties and privileges. To
say someone has legal rights or duties is to "supply a justification for
using or withholding the collective force of the state because they are
included in or implied by actual political decisions of the past."61
What do the Japanese do in a plan-rational economy? First, Johnson
suggests, there is compliance by the citizenry because of the "existence of a powerful, talented, and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy [which] is a natural corollary of plan rationality."62 Second,
Johnson sees both systems as concerned with externalities, for example, the unpriced cost of production, such as pollution. Third, the
plan-rational system is based upon "the existence of a widely agreed
58. Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); See Elizabeth Mensch, The History
of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 13-37 (David Kairys ed.
1982).
59. For a recent exposition of the Kantian type social contract theory, see JOHN
RowLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
60. JOHNSON, supra note 56, at 19.
61. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 97 (1986).
62. JOHNSON, supra note 56, at 21.
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upon set of goals for society, such as high-speed growth. '63 Johnson
equates "agreed upon" with "a consensus exists." But an agreement
is not the same as a consensus. I think Johnson means to emphasize
consensus, because nothing he says indicates he believes there are
many agreements made between the principal Japanese players. This
will become more clear when we examine administrative guidance in
government regulation and conciliation in dispute resolution.
Finally, in Japan decisions are made by the elite bureaucracy, as opposed to the American process of parliamentary policy determination.
The institution making the decisions in Japan has been MITI.64 MITI
has rationalized industrial policy at the micro level, with "state intrusion into the detailed operations of enterprises with measures intended to improve those operations (or, on occasion, to abolish the
enterprise)." One cannot imagine such a governmental activity in the
United States, outside of the defense industry, which not coincidentally is thought of as the least competitive and least market-oriented
segment of business in the U.S. economy.
Johnson contends that the Japanese government has been the inspiration and cause of Japanese economic success. Interventionism and
protectionism characterize the means to the successful export-dominant goal. And, if Johnson is correct, the Japanese government does
not regulate the economy primarily by means of laws or regulation,
the basic means of government involvement in the economy in the
United States.
D.

The Visible Hand

If Johnson approaches a nine on the fictional market economy
scale, Daniel I. Okimoto, comes closer to a five.65 Okimoto points out

that Japanese regulation by laws is not nearly as coercive as is found in
the United States. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Japanese industrial policy often lacks consistency, is short sighted, and fails. The recent decline of the stock market, losses, in real estate, negative growth
in industrial production and the real gross domestic product attest to
this.6 6 One commentator even asserts that the Japanese economy is in
disarray and "the Government bureaucrats who managed Japan's economic success appear to be groping" while "the policymakers acumen
is being questioned." 67
Okimoto defines "industrial policy" in terms of the government's
use of its authority and resources to administer policies affecting specific sectors, not just macroeconomic policies. What distinguishes Ja63. Id. at 22.

64. Id. at 26.
65. DANIEL 1. OKIMOTO, BETWEEN
TRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY

MITI AND THE MARKET, JAPANESE INDUS1-53 (1989).
66. World Economies, N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1993, at D2.
67. James Sterngold, ChartingJapan's Course, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1993, at D1.
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pan and the United States is that in Japan the government acts on the
basis of anticipated outcomes, while Washington reacts to problems
after they occur. Japan's preventative approach suggests a more active role by government in the economy. How is this done? Okimoto
says they "consult closely with private-sector producers in ways that
ensure voluntary compliance, if not positive cooperation."68 Public
policies are implemented "through consultation, consensus, and voluntary compliance." 69 Unlike the United States, Japanese economic
and political institutions are able to fine-tune specific sectors of the
economy, to anticipate and direct, in order to avoid or achieve. The
Japanese government shows little faith in the invisible hand of the
market economy, and therefore establishes specific industrial sector
policy goals, assists in development, protects selected industries, organizes or permits cartels, regulates technology, and engages in administrative guidance70 -

a quasi-legal form of administration -

to

achieve its purposes.
The Japanese government sets specific and long term goals. Like
the bonsai in a traditional Japanese garden, nature may be paramount,
but the guiding hand of man will enhance the beauty it produces.7 '

E. A Different Relationship
The authors discussed above come to different conclusions about
the role of government in the Japanese economy. They share, nonetheless, some common themes. Whatever the role of the government,
they seem to agree that the Japanese government makes decisions
about broad goals, and adopts specific industry oriented policies to
achieve them. Businesses aspire to these goals, and operate not as a
result of the coercive force of legislatively created obligations, nor as
the result of administrative regulations having the force of law, but
because they are involved in a consultive dialogue with government,
respect and obey the bureaucrats they deal with, and reach a consensus on means and ends.
The Japanese work together, and they operate without the same degree of legalism characteristic of the U.S. government-business relationship. The relationship between the Japanese government and the
individuals and businesses it governs is not based on an individualistic
concept, which Americans assume to be the basic premise of the market economy. The common theme of the authors discussed above,
that government and business in Japan relate to each other differently
than the same entities do in the United States, is the feature needing
to be explored in explaining why Japan's economy has been so successful. If there is something about the way Japanese relate to each
68. OKIMOTO, supra note 65, at 15.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 49.
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other which contributes to the problems set out initially, we would
expect to see those characteristics exemplified in other aspects of the
economy and society, not just in the relationship between government
and business. This is the next task.
III.

How

A.

JAPANESE RELATE: SOME EXAMPLES

Employer-Employee Relations

The characteristics most often associated with Japanese-style management, the "three pillars," are career jobs, company unions, and
seniority promotions, which together reflect "group approaches to decision making."7 2 The bonus payments made to all employees motivate them toward the goal of continued adequate financial
performance for the company. The objective of the business is the
growth and development of the enterprise.73
Career employment, which applies only to men, arguably distinguishes Japanese personnel policies from those in the United States.
The attitude that Boeing Corporation is benefiting the company by
releasing 28,000 employees during a year might leave the Japanese
mystified, just as it must leave 28,000 Boeing employees stupefied.
But in Japan, "[t]he mutual obligation is real, not a matter of lip service."' 74 It has its costs. Market share increase becomes important if
employees are not fired in an economic downturn. Older employees
are more expensive, but not necessarily more productive.
The enterprise union, the third of the three pillars, is closely identified with management and is non-adversarial.75 It is involved in decision making, engaging in extensive discussions with management, in
an informal effort to accommodate all views. This consensus building
process is another example of the tight integration of the individual in
the group, reflecting "an emphasis
on group values and behavior" and
76
of "group-centered decisions.
Some suggest that the "three pillars" employment relationship was
caused by government intervention through encouragement of modem personnel practices.77 Employers have little incentive to invest in
the training of highly skilled and productive employees if they will
leave at the first opportunity. Japanese employer-employee practices
reflect the value placed on security, as distinguished from valuing a
high-risk but high-reward relation.78 This contrasts with the basic U.S.
72. JAMES C. ABEGGLEN
RATION, 181-213 (1985).

& GEORGE

STALK JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPO-

73. Id. at 195.
74. Id. at 200.
75. Id. at 206-07.
76. Id. at 208.
77. James N. Baron, The Employment Relation as a Social Relation, 2 J. JAPANESE
INT'L ECON., 492, 516 (1988).
78. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 72, at 210.
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model of employer-employee relations where employees are assumed
to "remain in a state of rest unless compelled to change . . . by a
stronger force impressed upon them - namely, an optimal labor contract."79 It is assumed employees will go where they receive the most
pay. Individual freedom to change jobs, for better pay or more job
satisfaction, contrasts with loyalty to the group or company. The employer-employee relationship in Japan is characterized by a commitment between the two not usually found in the United States. While
not rising to the level of a legal or contractual obligation, employers
and employees in Japan have commitments to each other, allowing
them to work together with something less than the adversarial labormanagement dichotomy found in the United States.
B. Japanese Corporations:A FamilialRelation
Japanese corporations have some distinctive features. Shareholders
do not control the company. The Board of Directors is usually made
up of management insiders.8 ° The goal of the Japanese corporation is
increased market share, a benefit to the corporation, especially employees and managers. 8 ' Henderson characterizes this difference between Japanese firms and their U.S. counterparts with the phrase "the
familial firm."8 2 The Japanese company is communal. Labor is not
just a commodity to be bought at the cheapest price. Companies are
run for the benefit of the familial community. 3 Even Japan's largest
firms, the keiretsu, are described as interconnected families and are
characterized by cross-shareholding, informal ties, management contacts, and meetings with personal exchanges between the leaders.8 4
Mergers and acquisitions, the dominant theme of American financial markets through the eighties, did not play a similar role in Japan.
Although there are relevant legal constraints in Japan on mergers and
acquisitions, there is also an attitude toward them which illustrates the
theme of this inquiry.85 One such institutional constraint on mergers
and acquisitions is reciprocal share ownership between large companies in Japan. Cross-shareholding is not an arms-length investment
decision, but reflects a communal relationship which can be used in
times of trouble as an insurance policy, with expectations of support in
79. Baron, supra note 77, at 494.
80. Dan F. Henderson, Security Markets in the United States and Japan:Distinctive
Aspects Molded by Cultural,Social, Economic and PoliticalDifferences, 14 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 263, 276 (1991).

81.
82.
83.
84.

Okimoto, supra note 65, at 43.
Henderson, supra note 80, at 280.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 289; See also JEI Reports No. 2A Keiretsu and Other Large Corporate

Groups in Japan, 1-17, Jan. 12, 1990, at 3.
85. Merit E. Janow, Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan:A New Option for Foreign
Companies, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 586 (1988).
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the event of a threat to independence.86 These cultural and organizational patterns make a hostile takeover unlikely; indeed, none has occurred. The Japanese corporation is more than the sum of its assets,
or even the market value of its shares. Employee well-being, employment security, and a cultural perspective reflecting communal values
limit the role of mergers and acquisitions in Japan.
C. The Closed Society
The Japanese distribution system is seen as an invisible barrier to
U.S. penetration in either the consumer market or support market for
Japanese industry. The Japanese are accused of being underachievers
in consumption of imports, be it automobiles, finished wood products,
semiconductors or steel.87 One cause is "the Japanese industrial family exhibits great intra-group loyalty."' 88 Japanese purchasing agents
prefer to deal with those they know and trust, often rejecting the opportunity to change suppliers for a lower price. This emphasis on
"group loyalty, interdependence, and non-adversarial decision-making
may result in market behavior" different from that found in the
United States, "where individualism and 'survival of the fittest' are
emphasized. 89 Whereas in the United States long term business relationships are usually based on contracts, in Japan personal relationships, interfirm ties, and mutual trust underlie purchasing decisions.'
This is true in even the consumer market, where personal contact in
neighborhood shopping is an important social value, not easily offset
by cheaper prices. 9 '
Examples abound of the Japanese market to illustrate it is closed to
U.S. products. In some product lines, Hewlett-Packard Co. has sixty
percent of the U.S. market, ninety percent of the European market,
but only one percent in Japan.92 This suggests there is "something
unfair and unacceptable." 93 The Japanese market is perceived as
closed to foreign products. After airplanes, the largest U.S. imports
into Japan are maize, raw wood and fish, which reflects that not only
the amount, but the makeup of trade is a problem.9" U.S. firms are
not the only ones who have trouble cracking the Japanese market.
86. Id. at 588.
87. ALAN WOLFF, U.S.-Japan Relations and the Rule of Law: The Nature of the
Trade Conflict and the American Response, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE:
SHOULD IT CHANGE? 146-56 (Kozo Yamamura ed. 1990).
88. Id. at 146.
89. Report to the House Committee on Ways and Means or Investigation No. 332283 Under Section 332(g) of the Tarriff Act of 1930, Phase 1: Japan's Distribution
System and Options for Improving U.S. Access 1-15, at 7 (1990).
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Keatley, supra note 17.
93. Id.
94. Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr., It's Clinton's Turn To Bargain With Japan,N.Y TIMES,
Apr.15, 1993, at A21.
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Honda, Toyota, Nissan and Matsushita Electric all have trading companies which try to fill their ships with goods from the United States
so they do not have to return to Japan empty. Their success has been
limited.95
D. Summary Observations
Americans perceive Japan as a problem and threat. The deficit in
trade, Japanese successes in imports into the United States and the
seeming failures of U.S. businesses to penetrate the Japanese market,
have increased tensions between the two nations. The quest for the
causes of Japan's apparent successes, and our apparent failures, yields
no easy or consistent conclusions. But common themes include: (1)
that the Japanese relate to each other in business and government differently from the way we do in the United States; (2) in Japan government and businesses work in a consensual manner, with fewer clearly
defined rules spelling out rights or duties; (3) workers and employers
develop relationships to mutually pursue the betterment of the company; (4) in the public sector the primary implement of government
direction is not legislation and formal rule-making; and (5) in the private sector, what one should do is not usually determined by contractually imposed obligations, but on the basis of something much more
personal, something based on established relationships. I next attempt to show how these Japanese attitudes de-emphasize what
Americans consider very important: the concepts of obligations and
rights. Starting with the private sector, I examine the role of contracts
in Japan, then move to the public sphere, to illustrate the roles of administrative guidance in the regulatory process and conciliation in the
legal system. Freedom of contract (the private sector) and rule of law
(the public sector) are basic concepts in the American myth surrounding government and the economy. The Japanese do not rely on these
concepts to the same extent we do. Their success challenges our basic
suppositions. That is a problem with Japan - it challenges basic
American assumptions and rhetoric about how things should be.
IV.

BETWEEN

"Is"

AND "OUGHT": DUTIES, RIGHTS,

AND PRIVILEGES

A. Private Sector: Japanese Attitudes Toward Contracts
Dan Henderson identifies the most distinctive difference between
Japanese and American business culture in the respective roles of law
and individualism.96 American concepts are molded by a view of individualism which gives rise to legalistic concepts of rights and duties,
whether arising out of contracts or laws. The Japanese, by contrast,
95. Kathryn Graven, Japan's Major Exporters Are Striving to Balance U.S. Trade
by Filling Ships Going The Other Way, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1993, at A7.
96. Henderson, supra note 80, at 264.
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are "normally submerged in, and highly disciplined by, their social
groupings."97 Whereas obligations in the United States are often expressed in lengthy contracts between parties to business transactions,
and are thought of as voluntarily entered into, in Japan there is less
tendency to view obligations as voluntarily incurred based on a manifestation of mutual intent, than to see them as arising from a social
context, often associated with the status of the parties and based on
hierarchical authority.98 Japanese attitudes toward collective activity,
with deference to those in authority, permeates attitudes toward contractual obligations.
Iyori Hiroshi argues that the Japanese view contracts differently
from Americans. While Japanese believe promises should be
honored, "in a strict sense contracts are not considered particularly
important, even when concluded." 99 It seems natural and obvious to
change the contract if the circumstances change. Thus, there are few
suits brought in Japan for breach of contract. Takeyoshi Kawashima
finds that in everyday life there is a vast difference between Japanese
consciousness of contracts, and the concepts of contract reflected in
Japan's westernized Civil Code." ° One characteristic of the Japanese
consciousness toward contracts is the tendency to not clarify whether
a contract has or has not been formed by the words and actions of the
parties. Clarifying the contract, by reducing it to writing, may be seen
as a sign of mistrust of the other party. 101
A common feature of Japanese written contracts is the inclusion of
"confer in good faith" and "harmonious settlement" clauses. In unforeseen circumstances the parties will confer to reach a cost or burden sharing solution to the problem, and if they disagree they will
settle harmoniously. These provisions, when included in Japanese
contracts, reflect the tentative nature of the rights and duties, and that
it is desirable to fix problems by ad hoc consultation.'0 2
While generally American businesses have some of the same attitudes toward contracts as the Japanese, when a disagreement arises,
contracts are treated as creating defined rights and duties. In practice,
contract rights and duties have to be reexamined in light of changed
circumstances, and one who always insists on his or her rights, may
soon be without suppliers or subcontractors. 0 3 But with this caveat,
97. Id.
98. Id. at 295.
99. Iyori Hiroshi, Antitrust and IndustrialPolicy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 56-82, 62 (Gary R.
Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).
100. Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contractin Japan,7 L. JAPAN 1, 2 (Charles R. Stevens trans., 1974).
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 17.
103. Whitmore Gray, The Use and Non-Use of Contract Law in Japan:A Preliminary Study, 17 L. JAPAN 98, 103 (1984).
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there is a difference between Japanese and American attitudes toward
contracts. In the United States, one must fulfill the obligations of a
contract, because that is what one has voluntarily agreed to do. Individuals making contracts in their own best interest is fundamental to
the American concept of the free market economy. For the Japanese,
the group relationship created and sustained is important; the goal of
the arrangement being to work together to fulfill each others expectations in a mutually advantageous way.
B. Public Sector: Rights, Duties, and the Law
How do societies get individuals within the society to act contrary to
what they believe to be in their own self-interest? Problems arise
when citizens are called upon to sacrifice their self-interest for something else; be it a greater common good or something of intrinsic
value. In the public sector the goal is to motivate and justify an individual's decision to move from self-interest to do what should be
done.
The Japanese are reasonably successful in getting each other to "do
what they ought to do." I have stated, without great elaboration, that
in the United States .the law is a primary instrument within the society
for getting individuals and businesses to conform to what they ought
to do. The law is the system of legislative, administrative, and judgemade rules and regulations which create duties, rights and privileges.
Laws prescribe rights and duties, and provide the coercive mechanism
motivating compliance. 1°4 The Japanese do not rely on either the prescriptive or coercive aspects of laws to the same extent Americans do.
In sections II and III we saw how the Japanese make decisions
about the direction of their economy, select broad goals, effectuate
means achieving the goals, yet have a competitive market economy.
They accomplish this by consensus-building, respect for the elite bureaucracy, common ideology of values, close and harmonious government-business relationships, a plan-rational economy, intervention
and protection, voluntary compliance, positive cooperation, quasilegal administration, a guiding hand, group values and behavior,
group-centered decisions, employee-employer commitment, the familial-model business enterprise, and long term business relationships.
While I emphasize these characteristics, these same characteristics
also are found in the U.S. economy. Toyota and Ford make cars.
Their products are similar. Their production methods are similar. But
differences are worth noting, and have implications beyond the bottom line.
How the Japanese in the public sector get people to "do what they
ought to do" and how they differ from the U.S. approach, can be illustrated by examining two related Japanese practices: administrative
104. See

DWORKIN,

supra note 61.
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guidance and conciliation in the legal system. While some aspects of
these two social practices can be found in the United States, their
dominant place in Japan points out a difference in the roles of the
concepts of duties, rights, rules, courts, and coercion in getting people
to act for a common good.
1. Administrative Guidance
According to John Haley, the use of administrative guidance in Japan has insured that competitive market forces, rather than bureaucratic goals, have been the determining force in Japan's economy. 05
The purpose of guidance is to indicate the "acts the recipient should
perform in the future" and to "lead the recipient in a specific direction."'" Administrative agencies influence parties through non-authoritative means, as opposed to legally coercive means, to cooperate
voluntarily with the agencies' guidance toward the formation of the
social order.107 In a legalistic society a rule is formulated, setting the
normative goal, and a regulatory agency or court enforces it if there is
noncompliance. Administrative guidance combines prescriptive and
coercive functions into one activity. The norm and its implementation
evolve from the process. This is not to suggest the effect of hierarchy
is absent.
Four characteristics of administrative guidance should be mentioned. First, guidance is provided by a specific administrative organ
which is concerned with its administrative field. This allows it to develop expertise in the field, and increases credibility with those
guided. However, the agency is not primarily implementing statutes
or regulations. The agency has a general obligation for its sphere, and
guidance is used to fulfill this obligation. 10 8
Second, administrative guidance does not involve coercive action by
the agency. Because guidance does not have a legal character it is considered voluntary. The agency cannot enforce the guidance in court.
The agency does not have at its disposal "significant collateral enforcement."" 9 There have been cases where administrative guidance
has been challenged in court by the regulated party. Generally the
courts have found no justiciable issue, because of the voluntary character of compliance. But court challenges to guidance have been allowed where the refusal to "voluntarily comply" has resulted in the
105. JOHN O. HALEY, Administrative Guidance Versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Paradoxof Industrial Policy, in Law and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy 107-128, 108 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).
106. Kanuo Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and The Rule of Law, 7 L. JA22 (Peter Figdor trans., 1974).
107. Yoriaku Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 L. JAPAN 45 (James L. Anderson

PAN

trans., 1968).
108. Id. at 46.
109. Michael K. Young, Administrative Guidance in the Courts: A Case Study in
Doctrinal Adaptation, 17 L. JAPAN 120, 129 (1984).
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loss of a benefit the agency controls, like the refusal to issue a license
or permit.110 Bureaucratic excess will be checked by the courts, because it contradicts the "emphasis on societal consensus rather than
formal procedure in administrative guidance."'11
The third characteristic of administrative guidance is that it is often
used without statutory authority. This further emphasizes the nonobligatory character of the result. Some Japanese legal scholars accept this non-statutory basis of guidance, but some find it antithetical
to the concepts of rule of law and popular sovereignty. 1 2 Others have
criticized administrative guidance as unfair and arbitrary, recommending that administrative guidance "ought to be carried out in writing clearly specifying the laws and regulations on which guidance is
based."1 3' But, eliminating the arbitrary by clarifying the rules would
take guidance out of the realm of nonenforceable commitment into
the realm of legal obligation.
The fourth characteristic of guidance is that the agency exercises
influence over the parties' concurrence "through the expression of expectations and wishes.""' 4 The agencies often have "a superior and
domineering position over the people and have behind them all manner of coercive authority based on laws and regulations.""' 5 This, coupled with the traditional Japanese "deference to authority and related
desire to maintain harmony and cooperation and16to avoid adversarial
posturing" add a coercive element to guidance.
There are three kinds of administrative guidance.' 17 Promotional
guidance promotes governmental policies which are industry specific.
Regulatory administrative guidance is a substitute for law. It includes
guidance to enterprises to act or refrain from acting, as illustrated in
the check-prices and five-distributor-rule discussed in Matsushita Electric,' 8 and the voluntary restrictions on steel imports central to Consumers Union. 1 9 The third type of administrative guidance is
conciliatory. Conflicts between enterprises falling under the agency
are reconciled. An example is the resolution of conflicts between
large retail stores and small shops, where MITI or a local government
agency use conciliation to settle disputes. 20
110. Id. at 130, 135.
111. Id. at 142.
112. Yamanouchi, supra note 106, at 27-31.
113. KEIDANREN, TOWARDS AN OPEN, TRANSPARENT AND FAIR MARKET ECONOMY-PROPOSALS FOR DEREGULATION, 1-14, 11 (July 7, 1992).
114. Narita, supra note 107, at 46.
115. Id. at 77.
116. HALEY, supra note 105, at 109.
117. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Legal Framework of Japanese Industrial Policy, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REV. 541, 552-53.
118. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
119. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d. 136 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
120. Matsushita, supra note 117, at 553.
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Haley points out that in Japan, administrative guidance is "the process of governing."' 12 1 He believes guidance is effective because the
guided end up seeing the goals to be achieved as their own. One reason this occurs is because the guided have a significant input into the
guidance. Guidance is not one-directional; agencies "are forced to
bargain and strike the best deal they can get.' 1 22 Consensus is the
goal.
How do the Japanese determine what ought to be done, and get
each other to do it? One way is to set goals in an informal, non-legalistic process, arrived at by consensus. This insures noncoercive compliance because people see the achievement of the goals as in their
collective interest, if not their individual self-interest. The process of
norm-making reinforces norm-compliance. This is probably the most
significant way in which the Japanese get others to do "what they
ought to do" in the public sphere, and it contrasts sharply with the
legalistic conception of rights and duties characteristic of American
social ordering. Japanese and Americans differ as to how norms of
conduct are created, and how compliance is obtained. The differences, and the fact that the Japanese system works, by implication
challenges the way Americans assume things should work.
2.

Courts, Law, and Conciliation

Japan has it's share of statutory rules, administrative regulations
and court precedents. These set norms for behavior, prescribing what
people or businesses should or should not do, with enforcement procedures providing incentives to motivate desired conduct. In this respect, Japan and the United States do not differ. Japan characterizes
itself as a country of law, and given the similarities between the
United States and Japan's post-war legal systems, this is an appropriate characterization.
But there are differences in the way the two systems work, particularly in the area of dispute resolution. Americans see laws as setting
norms of conduct; creating rights and duties. Contracts have the same
function in the private sphere. To justify a position that someone
ought to be acting differently from the way they are acting, or are
contemplating acting, we point to a law or contract provision as creating a duty on them to so act, or as giving us a right which is being
infringed on by their action. Disputes are settled by appeals to rights
and duties arising from laws and contracts.
Disagreements occur both about the facts, the rules of conduct, and
their meaning or applicability. These disputes are capable of being resolved by the courts, which not only adjudicate the particular dispute,
but do so by interpreting the legal norms, expanding on them, clarify121. HALEY, supra note 105, at 111.
122. Id. at 114.
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ing them, and generalizing them. Dispute resolution by litigation is a
prominent aspect of American culture. This is not so of Japan. Disputes arising under formalized rules embodied in laws or contracts are
often resolved in Japan without court adjudication. The Japanese
practice of conciliation, like the practice of administrative guidance,
reflects the effort to resolve problems and disagreements by reaching
a consensus.
a. Historical Observations
The pre-modern Japanese legal system focused on criminal law
rather than civil law. This encouraged parties to settle civil disputes
by mediation between the parties, through informal negotiations.
Even when mediators were involved, there were no impartial third
party rulings, which inhibited the development of a civil and commercial body of law.123 During the Meiji Restoration, Japan adopted a
western style legal system based on the German Civil Code in order to
eliminate extraterritoriality. This code provided both substantive
rules establishing rights and duties, and a procedural framework for
resolving disputes. However, the civil code played little role in dispute resolution, and courts were seen as a tool of the rulers, with enforcement a virtual monopoly of the government. 124 There continued
to be an 25emphasis on conciliation as the means for dispute
resolution.1
After World War II, Japan's legal system was infused with American concepts, including the affirmation of the peoples' sovereignty,
guarantees of human rights, and creation of an independent judiciary.
The idea of rule of law supplanted the practice of rule by law. 126 The
framework of the Japanese court system is similar to that found in the
U.S. federal system. The absence of jury trial and the civil law practice of carrying out trials in incremental stages, with no distinction between pretrial and trial procedures, distinguishes Japanese practice
from American. 27
Haley summarizes the development of law in Japan by pointing out
it has had a limited function in society, has been characterized by
123. Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution in Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects, with Special Emphasis on In-Court
Compromise, 20 L. JAPAN 74 (1987); Ryosuke Ishii, Book Review of D.F Henderson's Conciliation and Japanese Law-Tokugawa and Modern, 2 L. JAPAN 198, 202,
209. (K. Huff trans., 1968).
124. Hideo Tanaka & Akio Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of Law: A Comparative Study of Japanese and American Law, 7 L. JAPAN 34, 38
(1974).
125. Ishii, supra note 123, at 210.
126. Kahei Rokumoto, Problems and Methodology of Study of Civil Disputes, 5 L.
JAPAN

127.

97, 100 (1972).
JOEL B. HARRIS, LITIGATION IN JAPAN:

MANUAL

A TRIAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

66-69 (1980).
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weak enforcement, and has failed to provide effective remedies or
sanctions.12 8 Nonetheless, law serves an important function, because
legal rules "serve as tatemae, guiding principles, and as such relate
directly to the development of social and political consensus. "129
b. Litigation in Japan
According to Haley, the Japanese legal system can best be described as "the weakness of legal versus social control."' 3 ° This does
not mean the Japanese do not understand or live by rules. On the
contrary, according to Henderson, "the traditional Japanese society
was rule-ridden and behavior was minutely prescribed by society, not
justiciable law."'' What distinguishes the Japanese is the interdiction
through other institutional132arrangements, like conciliation, in the judicial enforcement process.
The facts are stark. There are only 16,000 qualified lawyers in Japan, fewer than the number of judges in Germany.' 33 This compares
with 700,000 lawyers in the United States, approximately one for
every 3108 residents. 34 In the early eighties, there were nine times as
many civil suits filed in California on a per capita basis than in Japan.
In 1982 there were 264,690 ordinary civil cases filed in Japan, plus
76,975 motions for conciliation. 135 When a Boeing 747 crashed in Japan in 1985, only 21 lawsuits were filed, on behalf of only 100 of the
500 Japanese victims, whereas all the non-Japanese victims' families
sued. 136 Surely, as to litigation, this points out Japanese are less litigous than Americans.
c. Conciliation and Dispute Resolution
The role of litigation in Japan in dispute resolution is less important
than it is in the United States.' 37 Japanese leaders use a pattern of
mediation and conciliation, while American leaders use the command
and adjudication pattern. 38 Mediation and conciliation have as their
goal dispute resolution by agreement and consensus of the patties,
rather than resolution by an independent third party. Though extra128. John 0. Haley, Law and Society in Contemporary Japan: American Perspec-

tives, 17 L. JAPAN 1 (1984).
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 1.
131. Dan F. Henderson, The Japanese Law in English: Some Thoughts on Scope

and Method, 16 VAND. J.

TRANSNAT'L

L. 601, 608 (1983).

132. Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons With the
West, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985).

133. Id. at 375.
134. Thorn Weidlich, The Most and the Greediest, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 2.
135. Tanaka, supra note 132, at 377.
136. Andrew Pollack, Japan Debates BroaderPowers For Consumers, N.Y.
Mar. 8, 1993, at Al, D2.
137. Rokurnoto, supra note 126, at 102; Obuchi, supra note 123.
138. Obuchi, supra note 123, at 211.
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legal conciliation needs no authority other than the agreement of the
parties, conciliation within Japan's court system was established in
1951 by the Civil Conciliation Law.' 3 9

Conciliation, as the preferred method of dispute resolution, substitutes the parties agreement for judicial decision. Thus, conciliation
inhibits the development of court-made commercial and civil law in
Japan. 140 This contrasts with the United States, where a primary
source of law is judicial decisions.
Why do the Japanese emphasize conciliation in dispute resolution?
There are many suggestions. Japanese look on civil disputes as reis not
flecting impaired relations between parties, and a favorable goal
141 Civil
only to resolve the dispute, but harmonize the relationship.
trials in Japan have analogies with criminal trials, in that both deal
with culpability. Thus, repentance and apology can be as important as
goals more readily achieved in conciliation than in
compensation;
42
litigation.'
Individuals do not play an important role in enforcement of antitrust, securities, or consumer protection laws, this being the province
of the government.143 Regulatory statutes are enforced by criminal
sanctions, with no significant means of private civil enforcement. 44
There have been only 150 reported product liability decisions in Japan.' 45 MITI claims few are dissatisfied with the system as it exists.
Criticism of conciliation in Japan in dispute resolution is much like
criticism of administrative guidance. Excessive use of conciliation
stunts the growth and refinement of rules necessary to sustain complex commercial and community life.' 46 Conciliation is satisfactory to
the individual parties, but often there are social concerns which transcend the immediate dispute. Emphasis on conciliation tends to eliminate the legal system, and its ability to set out social concerns in rules
of decision, which benefit society as a whole. 147 Failure to litigate
cases involving issues of public interest, like whether products are safe
or unsafe, tends to cover up bad laws and practices. 48 All of these
criticisms apply equally well to the adverse effect of excessive reliance
on administrative guidance.
139. 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (Z. Kitagawa ed., 1989).
140. Ishii, supra note 123, at 211.
141. Id. at 209.
142. Koichiro Fujikura, A Comparative View of Legal Culture in Japan and the
United States, 16 L. JAPAN 129, 131 (Malcolm D.H. Smith trans., 1983).
143. Ichiro Kato, The Concerns of Japanese Tort Law Today-In Comparison with

American Law, 1 L. JAPAN 79, 91 (Rex Coleman trans., 1964).
144. Tanake & Takeuchi, supra note 124, at 36.
145. Pollack, supra note 136, at Al.
146. Obuchi, supra note 123, at 89.
147. Ishii, supra note 123, at 213-14.

148. Kato, supra note 143, at 87.
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The critics are few, and certainly not powerful,. Enforcement of
rules is subservient to consensus building. This is the common method
of both guidance and dispute resolution. While Japan is a country of
law, it is not a country in which litigation plays a significant role in
societal control. Japanese are motivated by different concerns than
the fear of litigation or governmental penalty.
C. Judicial Competence in Policy Issues
Americans view laws as the basic protection of freedom and equality. By contrast, the Japanese consider law as "primarily an instru1' 49
ment of government control, especially bureaucratic control.'
Japan's Constitution guarantees freedom of choice in occupations,
which has been interpreted to include freedom in business activity.
Article 29 guarantees private ownership of property. The free enterprise system is "essentially constitutionalized."' 5 ° While government
may restrict these constitutional rights, how the Japanese courts involve themselves in policy issues contrasts with the practice of U.S.
courts.
The Supreme Court of Japan, as with the United States Supreme
Court, has the last word on the constitutionality of legislation. In Japan the Court will scrutinize legislation providing for general public
safety and order, to determine if it is as restrictive as possible. If it is
not, it may be declared unconstitutional. The court feels it has the
competence to judge the constitutionality of general public safety
laws, and will judicially intervene when the exercise of police power is
perceived as overly broad.
However, where a challenged law or regulation "is intended to
achieve some social-economic objective such as the protection of
farmers, small enterprises or other disadvantaged groups" the Court
will generally not declare such regulations unconstitutional, deferring
instead to the legislative branch.' 5 ' For example, in what the commentators have called the "Retail Business Market Case," involving
Japanese laws which give the local governments authority to impose
conditions on the issuance of licenses for retail establishments, including protecting small shops by territorial allocations, the Japanese
Supreme Court held that policies dealing with excessive competition
1 52
were beyond its competence and best left to the legislature.
Contrast this with the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Lochner v.
New York, where the Court declared unconstitutional a statute setting
maximum hours for bakers, holding that the state had no justifiable
reason "for interfering with the liberty of person or the right or free
149.
150.
151.
152.

Hiroshi, supra note 99, at 62.
Matsushita, supra note 117, at 546.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 549.
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contract.' 1 53 Only if the law relates to public health, as opposed to

regulating particular groups, can it be constitutional when it impinges
individual liberties. Laws which redistribute resources fall outside the
scope of proper legislative functions.
Lockner is old law, long ago discredited, but not totally forgotten.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.' illustrates the same point, and
contrasts well with what Japan's Supreme Court might do. The City of
Richmond created a minority set-aside program for awarding municipal contracts. The city's population was about fifty percent black, and
a goal was set to award thirty percent of the city's construction contracts to black owned firms. In the past, less than one percent of those
contracts had been awarded to black businesses. This remedial regulation, designed to benefit a specific group, with regard to public contracts, seems classic "plan-rational" economics versus a market
economy. Appealing to the Constitution's requirement of equal treatment by the law, the Supreme Court declared the regulation unconstitutional. Richmond could not solve the problem of persistent
inequality in the awards of its contracts by favoring a specific group,
because to do so would unconstitutionally discriminate against those
not in the group, i.e., whites.
In the United States, a regulation that is group or industry specific,
which benefits some individuals to the detriment of others, is suspect,
particularly if based on categories like race. In Japan, where regulations are often industry specific and designed to favor one group over
others, such laws are not constitutionally suspect, and courts will defer
to the legislative choice.
D. Summary Observations
For the Japanese, rights and duties are less important in getting people to do what they ought to do than is the role of social groups. In
their private relations, the Japanese would rather work together in
good faith and harmony, than insist on their rights. The government
guides citizens toward shared goals. What one ought to do and the
motivation to do it evolve out of the same process. Planned and directed activity, rather than after-the-fact regulation, characterizes administrative guidance. Dispute resolution by conciliation rather than
by appeals to enforcement of rights or duties is the norm. A weak
sense of the judicial system as an effective mechanism of social order,
coupled with the courts' deference to micro-management through
government regulation and guidance, illustrates differences between
Japan and the United States.
Japan is perceived as a problem for the United States because of its
success, and the means used to achieve it. This, in turn, conflicts with
153. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
154. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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American assumptions about how the free enterprise system should
work in relation to law, regulation, rights and duties in society. If Japan functions as summarized above, then America's myth about itself
is suspect. What are the implications for the American myth which
follow from Japan's "differences" and its success?
V.

MYTHS COLLIDE

Try this game. Suppose you are given a box of beads to string.
Each bead represents a nation's view about itself. The first bead
placed on the string is Japan's view about itself. It is at one end. The
next bead you string should represent that nation whose view about
itself you think most similar to Japan's view about itself. Then select
the bead of the nation with a view about itself closest to the second
bead on the string; and so on. Which nation's bead ends up at the far
end of the string? It is not implausible to suggest the bead for the
United States.1 55 This would be consistent with our feeling that much
of the conflict between Japan and the United States arises because of
differences in the cultures. To understand these differences, we need
to articulate how we understand the Japanese, and how the Japanese
view themselves.
A.

The Japanese Myth of Uniqueness

Japanese regard themselves as unique; individually and culturally.
Japanese present the "seductive image of harmonious sociality in raw
contrast to the alienated structure of Western life.' 5 6 Japanese books
discussing Japanese identity or nationalism have taken on the commercial character of a successful cottage industry. From 1946 to 1978
approximately 700 books were published in Japan on Japanese uniqueness. 5 7 One such work, apparently not atypical, by University of
Tokyo Professor Hajime Nakamura, was published by the Japanese
National Commission for UNESCO in 1960.158 A brief summary of
this work will exemplify the outline of the Japanese view about their
uniqueness.
Nakamura argues that the Japanese are unique in their way of
thinking. The Japanese tendency to emphasize feelings causes them to
attach "much importance to the rules of propriety which are based
upon human relationships.' 1 59 An example would be the feelings of
the inferior to obey the superior and to act from feelings of deco155. AUSTIN COATES, CHINA, INDIA AND THE RUINS OF WASHINGTON

(1972). The

bead game is a variation of one suggested by Coates, only with India and China at
opposite ends as to cultures.
156. PETER N. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE UNIQUENESS 3 (1986).

157. Id. at 14-15.

158. HAJIME NAKAMURA,
(1960).
159. Id. at 304.

THE WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES
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rum.1 60 Japanese have a strong regard for the relations of many individuals, rather than for the individual as an independent entity. The
individual is not the fundamental entity of society. Individuals are
subordinate to a nexus, and are conceived of in terms of human relations.16 ' This nexus of Japanese social life is manifest in the family. It
is "an inherent tendency in the Japanese to lay emphasis upon rank
and relations of master and servant."'1 62 Social order is based on rank,
including devotion to the sovereign, which1 63"has constituted the basis
of morality throughout Japanese history.'
Nakamura contends Japanese emphasis on a specific limited human
nexus is manifest by ultra-nationalism." 64 This justifies sacrifices made
for the state, and fosters respect for authority. Complete devotion to
a specific person, like the Emperor, boss, or superior reflects the submissive pattern of Japanese thinking. In these relationships, the distinction between good and evil is the equivalent of the distinction
between submission or non-submission. 65 Emphasis on a limited social nexus is consistent with a lack of concern for universal or eternal
laws. Japanese are indifferent to so-called universal religions. 66 The
Japanese social cooperative structure causes them to value high es67
teem or prestige, and enhances the role of shame in social order.
Conformity to mores is the essence of the dedication to a particular
human nexus.' 68 The tendency to stress harmony in society leads to a
spirit of conciliation and tolerance. 69
This view of Japanese uniqueness reinforces the theories considered
above to explain the Japanese miracle. Underlying them is some view
that Japanese and Americans are not alike. But is this because the
Japanese are unique? Hondas and Fords are not alike, but are
Hondas unique? Should discussions about economic conflicts become
"entangled in dubious references to the decisive differences in mentality and17culture"
supposed to exist between Japan and the United
0
States?
Jeffrey Garten seems to buy into Japan's myth about itself in A
Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for
Supremacy.171 Garten characterizes Japan as a communitarian society, where "the underlying philosophy is that the individual is an inte160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
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305.
308, 311.
326.
330.
337.
361.
381.
404, 414.

168. Id.at 438-39.
169. Id. at 444.
170. Id. at 567.
171. JEFFREY E.

GARTEN,
STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY
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(1992).
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gral part of the whole, and that one's best chance to develop fully is in
the context of the state's goals.' 72 . The state does not derive its powers from its citizens, but "from the idea of a state that existed above
and apart from the people."' 7 3 Garten summarizes: "Japan's mindset
communitarian values, a tightly woven culture, xenophobia, its 1'vi74
sion of merged public and private interests - goes back centuries.'
Any description of the Japanese as unique requires something
against which to compare them. "Japanliness" can only be articulated
by contrasting it with something like "the West" or "American." If
the Japanese tend to think of themselves as unique as a group, Americans are at the opposite extreme. Americans think of themselves as
unique as individuals, but as a society, everyone should and could be
like the United States. There is no American race or American language. Americans not only don't consider themselves unique, but are
intolerant of those who appear not to want to be like them. This is
especially true of the Japanese. Japan's biggest sin is in not being more
like America. If the Japanese think no one else could or should be
like them, Americans think everyone can, should and wants to be
American.
Of course, what the Japanese attribute to themselves as unique,
they must necessarily deny to others. Peter Dale, in his critique of this
genre of works on Japan's uniqueness, provides categories of the contrasts the Japanese make of themselves with "the West." Social contrasts between the West and Japan include: society vs. community;
individualism vs. groupism; horizontality vs. verticality; equalitarianism vs. hierarchy; contract vs. kintract; private vs. public; guilt vs.
shame; urban-cosmopolitan vs. rural-exclusive; rights vs. duties; and
independence vs. dependence. 75 Uniqueness here is not a sui generis
phenomenon, but is a contrast of values and interests based on a comparison with the West.' 7 6 It seems fundamental to Japan's myth about
itself that the individual neither exists nor thinks about himself or herself except in relation to the group.
I have used "myth" in connection with the articulation of those beliefs which seem irreducible. Beliefs about the primacy of the individual or society are not empirical or verifiable in any ordinary or
scientific sense. Though fundamental assumptions are not verifiable,
they can be challenged. The confrontation between Japan and the
United States, I believe, should include the recognition of the challenge the Japanese myth poses to the myth held dear by Americans
about themselves.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 96.
DALE, supra note 156, at 44.
Id. at 204.
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Why Japan Challenges the American Myth

The liberal-political-economic myth prevalent in America assumes
a commitment to individual freedom and free markets. "Free" means
absence of state intervention. Liberal theory is committed to the individual, with the State acting legitimately only in that sphere delegated
to it by individuals.' 77 The U.S. Constitution reflects this social contract. The Japanese myth assumes the primacy of the State, with individual goals subordinate to State goals, particularly economic
security. 178 As indicated, because the Japanese myth is articulated in
terms of their uniqueness, while the American myth is felt to be a
model all could and should follow, a collision is inevitable.
Freedom from government control is a fundamental value on the
American model. Unfortunately, freedom can only be preserved by
delegating to the State some authority to take action enhancing the
public good within narrow confines. Individual freedom, protected by
a limited constitutional government, is the basic concept of the market
economy. The market economy, based on decisions by individuals,
not the State, is the only economy which will efficiently function. This
is not one way of doing things; it is the only way. Individual freedom
equals success; government intervention means failure.
Japanese assumptions that the group is primary, that social control
is desirable, and that individual freedom is not the supreme value,
leads them to operate differently from Americans. On the American
theory they should fail. Indeed, some suggest we continue to wait until they do. 1 7 9 But Japan is not failing; and most doubt it will. One can
suggest Japan works because it is really like the United States - a
free market economy. Though there has been State interference in
the marketplace, it has become less directive in the past ten years.
Those with this view imagine how much greater Japan's economy
might have been had the State been less involved. 8 ° This view is no
comfort to those who see the continuation of the present scenario as
spelling economic disaster for many Americans. The dominant view is
that Japan is different, and it is hurting the United States. If the
American way is the right way, then Japan's success arises from doing
things the wrong way. The belief that Japan's success is based on doing things the "wrong way" soon translates into a claim that the Japanese are unethical or unfair. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Representative
has accused Japan of "outright engaging in unfair trade policies" while
the President, in meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan, "scolded"
177.

ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATION

27

(1992).
178. Id. at 31.
179. George Melloan, Japan's Economic Machine Needs an Overhaul, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at A15.
180. OKIMOTO, supra note 65; Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan,SII and the International
Harmonization of Domestic.Economic Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1991).
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the Japanese for not changing.' The rhetoric of American discourse
about the "problem" with Japan reflects that Japan challenges fundamental views. Japan is perceived as morally or legally wrong. If Japan
is different, then it should change, Americans are led to believe, and
many do believe it. What starts as a trade dispute takes on moral
tones.
C. Alternative Viewpoints
Whether Japanese trade unfairly depends on one's viewpoint. Consumers of Japanese products are not being coerced into buying them,
though the same cannot be said as to some U.S. products. From this
view, consumers are getting better goods for less money. Quotas artificially increase prices, preserve market share for noncompetitive domestic producers, and contradict free-market rhetoric. From the
viewpoint of domestic companies competing with Japanese imports,
their businesses are being damaged by imports. Jobs are lost and profits vanish. The demand for government interference in the market is
justified by characterizing Japanese competition as unfair. U.S. exporters to Japan want the government to intervene in the market by
compelling the Japanese to meet quotas, or temporary quantitative
indicators, to remove the invisible barriers to Japan's markets. The
U.S. government must reconcile the irreconcilable interests of those
promoting open markets, job protection, industry protection from
competition, and increased intervention in the faltering market to this
or that group's exclusive advantage. The Trade Representative and
President are encouraged to "get tough" with Japan.
There is no way to reconcile irreconcilable differences. But one
thing should change - the rhetoric. President Reagan termed the old
Soviet Union the "evil empire" and Americans rallied to see its defeat. Americans did this because it is easier to define "the enemy"
than to engage in self examination to solve problems. Some healthy
reappraisal is called for when it comes to United States-Japan
relations.
1. Solutions for Reappraising the Myth
We should start with a reappraisal of the myth we have about ourselves. The myth that the market operates fairly, neutrally, and apolitically, unless some participant acts improperly by allowing the
government to interfere, has been challenged by Japan's economic
success. American characterization of Japan as unethical is an unjustified rhetorical response to Japan's success, and to many apparent
American failures. The solutions proposed, including tariffs in response to alleged dumping, quotas in response to unacceptable U.S.
181. Gwen Ifill, Clinton and the Japanese Premier Scold Each Other on Trade Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Al.
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market penetration, and import quotas or targets for market share in
Japan, all have in common that they are a call on the U.S. government
to intervene in this international market because of alleged Japanese
wrongful conduct.
The first part of the myth to be reappraised is that there is a market
free from government or legal restriction or interference. The market
only exists because of the role of government. Governments in the
United States make the market possible; governments do not just occasionally regulate it. The so called "free market," that is, a market
existing apart from government intervention, is a crumbling myth.
The difference between Japan and the United States is not that
there is government intervention in Japan's economy, while there is
less in the United States. The difference is in the how, when, and
where of that interference, that is, in the values promoted by such
interference. A good example is in the area of competition between
retail stores. In Japan the Retail Business Adjustment Special Measures Law delegates authority to local governments to control the
opening of retail establishments by giving them the power to issue
licenses.'" 2 A developer, seeking to open a retail store in violation of
the market protection requirements, was indicted, and challenged the
law as a violation of the right to freely engage in a business activity.
Japan's Supreme Court upheld the validity of the legislation, deferring
to the legislature in such economic matters as control of competition.'8 3 The Japanese also regulate the opening of large retail stores
with the Large Scale Retail Stores Law, which protects small retail
operations from large competitors.184
Americans would probably say we have no laws governing retail
stores and their competition. This exemplifies the free market - the
absence of law in the market. But there is no absence of law. The law
in the United States is just different from the law in Japan. A recent
American hero of free enterprise was Sam Walton, who reportedly
became the richest man in America, while opening up hundreds of
Wal-Mart stores in rural areas. With $55 billion in annual sales, and
$2 billion in profits, one can only imagine the horror small retailers
faced when a new Wal-Mart store was announced for their community. 8 5 Thousands of small retailers have been driven out of business
by Wal-Mart stores opening in competition with them. To the bankrupt small retailer who seeks legal redress, we would say the law provides no remedy.
This is not to say there is no law. There is. The law is that a large
retailer like Wal-Mart can open its stores, and through competition
182. Matsushita, supra note 117, at 549.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 553.
185. Susan Pulliam, Wal-Mart Stock Tumbles as Investors Wonder If Dip in Sales is
Part of Longer-Term Trend, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at C2.
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injure or destroy its competitors, and the injury is privileged, that is,
the law provides no right of recovery by the injured party. As the U.S.
Supreme Court stated the rule, as between competitors, "when the
rights or privileges of the one are liable to conflict with those of the
other, each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not
unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of another."' 86 Wal-Mart competition hurts its competitors, though it may benefit consumers. As
long as it is fair competition, the law favors Wal-Mart. Japanese competition in America benefits some consumers, but injures other Americans and their businesses. To get around this injury being privileged,
it is alleged to be unfair. Unfair competition should be sanctioned.
The Japanese are not like Sam Walton. This is one reason our trade
problems with Japan are cast in moral terms. The worship of free
competition requires that government intervention be justified because some actor is doing something unfair and immoral.
The privilege to intentionally inflict injury on another, without the
duty to compensate the loss, unless the injury is inflicted unnecessarily, without just cause, or unfairly, involves drawing a line between
what is or is not just, unfair, or unnecessary. 18 7 In the United States
we have drawn this line so as to maximize freedom in competition; in
Japan they have drawn the line differently, to maximize protection.
This decision on where to draw the line 'reflects the resolution of the
conflict between competing interests or values. Will the law protect
large companies which destroy small competitors, what we call freedom, or will small competitors be secure in their market position because of protection by the law. Domestically we answer this question
in favor of freedom, but in trade with Japan, there is a trend to come
down on the side of protection. The conflict is between freedom and
security. We value both. The legal order, whether in Japan or the
United States, reflects the resolution of this conflict between freedom
and security. In Japan, the resolution is on the side of security, while
in the United States the resolution favors freedom. Referring back to
the fictional market continuum in section II, the dichotomy is not between legal interference and no legal interference in the market economy. The continuum reflects the social decision about what is to be
valued. The Japanese value security and community more highly than
do Americans, who emphasize the values of freedom from social control and individual autonomy. But the distinction
between interven88
tion and nonintervention is meaningless.
We should not make policy decisions about trade with Japan in
terms of what is seen as fair or unfair competition. There is nothing
fair or unfair about Japanese competition. If Japan subsidizes an in186. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
187. Oliver W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
188. See Francis Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MIcH. J. L.
REFORM 835 (1985)(as an example in domestic law).
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dustry, or protects it from imports, what is unfair about this? We
might better characterize it as a wise or foolish policy, but not unfair.
By unfair, we mean nothing more than that to meet the challenge,
domestic industries should be subsidized or protected from Japanese
competition. Additionally, concentrating on what the Japanese do,
and whether it is characterized as fair or unfair, detracts us from the
central issue: what are we doing that is right or wrong in our own
economy and what should we do, if anything, to protect or promote
activities or enterprises we consciously decide are deserving.
2. Competition and Cooperation
Too many policy discussions are posed in terms of mutually exclusive alternatives. The only choices are not between an economy free
from government interference and a command-economy on the former Soviet Union model. One need not choose between either individual rights or communitarian values; there can be accommodation
of both. Freedom and security are not either-or, there must be consideration given to both values. We often want conflicting things, but
decisions resolving such conflicts are not best made by always opting
for one over the other. Several suggestions seem appropriate in how
best to redirect our focus on the conflicts between domestic concerns,
international policy concerns, and Japan-U.S. trade issues.
. As Jeffrey Garten suggests, we should begin by changing some aspects of our view of ourselves. We could begin by recognizing that the
solution to pressing problems in our schools, healthcare system, crime,
racial conflict and urban decay will not be solved by lack of social
planning and governmental commitment. One should have a sanguine view about what government can accomplish, but not be a Pollyanna about what private efforts can accomplish. Recent difficulties at
IBM and GM should give one cause for wonder about the wisdom of
those making decisions in the private marketplace.
We should reevaluate the supposed universal applicability of our
myth about ourselves.' 8 9 With the demise of the evil empire, we must

not suppose the world is walking lockstep toward democracy and our
brand of capitalism. Instead of trying to export our institutions, we
would do better to critically revisit them. We should spend less effort
on making Japan in our image of ourselves, and more effort remaking
our institutions in light of the realities of Japanese and other foreign
competition. This does not mean remaking ourselves in the image of
Japan; a feat both undesirable and impossible.
Foreign policy, and international trade policy have generally been
the province of the government. According to the myth, the domestic
economy is best left to the invisible hand of free enterprise - not the
government. Thus we incorrectly feel we have no domestic economic
189.

GARTEN,

supra note 171, at 224.
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policy. But if we have learned anything from Japan's success, it is that
foreign policy, trade issues, and the domestic economy are interrelated and must be considered together. The self-contained domestic
economy does not exist. A domestic economy free from government
involvement reflecting policy decisions about what values are to be
promoted or protected never existed. We must discard the myth that
our lack of success in a particular area of international trade results
from unethical conduct by others. There are winners and losers in a
market economy. We do not lose only when the other side cheats.
Our emphasis on the value of individual choice and freedom, which
has been a strength, recognizes we are responsible for our own failures. When it comes to Japan, we discard this conclusion, in favor of
excuses which blame the Japanese. We will not have a better game
plan for tomorrow if our losses are thought to be only occasioned by
misconduct by our competition.
We have seen that the Japanese emphasize communitarian values as
much as we emphasize individual freedom, as a value to be promoted
and protected. But our new protectionism in trade with Japan belies
the rhetoric of our myth. Freedom is one value. It competes in our
concerns with the value of security and the interests of the community. We are evolving our own brand of economic nationalism. In
response to the challenge of the world marketplace, we are recognizing the inadequacy of an economy where the government responds
only after the problems have occurred. But economic nationalism focuses on protectionist policies. Our national economic policy should
focus on strengthening the competitiveness of the domestic economy.
Whether this is in terms of sound educational policies, effective
macro-economic policies, or policies which foster and support specific
industries or economic activities, we need to articulate these choices
for what they are: national policy decisions. This contrasts with the
present practice where favoring one sector of economic activity is disguised in terms of retaliatory measures in response to alleged unfair
trade practices by others.
Rethinking that part of the American myth which makes the individual the atom from which society is built would begin with the recognition that it makes just as much sense to believe that in the
beginning there is society, and that individual development is only
possible because of the sustenance of the community. 190 Communities, as the Japanese recognize, are the settings "within which mediated participation takes place."'91 What many of us think of as the
ideal family provides a model. Obligations within the family are not
based on bargained for rights and duties founded in consent. Family
relationships are not bargained for, specific or reciprocal. Family rela190. Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75
447 (1987).
191. Id. at 449.
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tionships are open-ended, non-specific, and generally involuntary.192
The legitimacy of the government and the political community should
not be seen to rest solely on the mythical consent of the governed, but
is equally implicit in the fact that we are members of a community.
The communitarian decision-making process in Japan is neither incomprehensible nor totally foreign to practices in the United States.
Administrative guidance, conciliation in dispute resolution, and a
plan-rational economy are not unique to the Japanese, though they
may carry them to extremes. But if their duty-conscious individual
subordinated to the social nexus is not appealing to us because it is
extreme, does not our rights-conscious individual whose freedom is
valued above many social goods not cause some concern as extreme in
the opposite direction? It may well be that the country which best
adjusts its myths to the emerging pattern of international interdependence will be the one enabling its people to create the highest standard of living.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Japan challenges America's myths about itself. Unless we can
reevaluate these fundamental assumptions about the individual's relation to the community, and the concepts of freedom in relation to governmental activity, we are doomed to condemn in morally vacuous
terms those other countries and their industries who succeed to the
detriment of the United States and its businesses. We will continue to
punish ourselves by imposing restrictions on their imports, or punish
them by bullying them into accepting our products. More importantly, we will divert our attention from our shortcomings, which demand a greater degree of planned and coordinated solution. The
Japanese challenge to our domestic priorities, and our shortcomings,
may well be the impetus to a reappraisal of what we value and encourage as social goals. If so, the problem with Japan, may in the end
be a blessing in disguise.

192. Id. at 451.
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